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Abstract
Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing (MGRM) hedged long term oil commitments on a one to
one basis with short term futures. Two very different views on the effectiveness of this hedging
strategy exist in the literature. On the one hand, Hanke, Culp and Miller argue that the strategy of
Metallgesellschaft was basically sound and effectively reduced MGRM´s oil price risk. On the other
hand, a number of authors like Ross, Edwards and Canter, Mello and Parsons argue that instead of
reducing its oil price risk, MGRM actually increased risk by using a grossly oversized hedge
position. This paper compares both arguments and their underlying assumptions. It shows that the
main reason for the diverging views lies in the implicitely assumed time horizon over which risk is
measured. The analysis reveals that hedgers with short time horizons will use a small hedge ratio of
only about one third, while the 1:1 hedge strategy followed by Metallgesellschaft was very effective
when risk is measured over the complete contract length.
We then test the effect of allowing cross hedges that were eligible under the MGRM hedging
program on MGRM’s short term risk. It is shown that even when risk is measured over a short time
horizon, the 1:1 hedge strategy had the potential to significantly reduce MGRM’s oil price risk once
cross hedges are admitted. Finally, we investigate the adequacy of MG’s equity cushion by
comparing its equity capital to the minimum equity requirements for banks from the new BIS
market risk proposals. It is shown that MG’s equity capital of MG was probably not sufficient to
cover its oil price risk under future BIS regulations for banks.
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1  Introduction
In December 1993, Metallgesellschaft (MG) was effectively bankrupt after huge losses in its oil
business that was conducted in its New York based subsidiary MG Refining and Marketing
(MGRM). According to officials at MG´s house bank, Deutsche Bank, the balance sheet losses
from its oil business will total approximately 4 billion DM. Losses from MGRM´s derivatives
activities in 1993 alone are reported to be 1.25 billion $ (2 billion DM at that time) of  which more
than 800 Million $ were realized in the fourth quarter alone.
1 Only a massive rescue operation of  a
large banking consortium kept MG from declaring bankruptcy. After the recent failure of Klöckner
in the oil business, MG is already the second large German company that experienced immense
losses from oil derivatives trading. Other spectacular losses from derivatives transactions at Proctor
and Gamble, Orange County and Barings raise the question, whether corporations can and should
use derivatives as a risk management tool. The answer to this question has become more ambiguous
through recent academic research which shows wide disagreement as to the proper way to hedge oil
price risk in the case of MGRM. On the one hand, authors like Culp, Hanke and Miller repeatedly
argued that the 1:1 hedge strategy of MGRM was a basically sound strategy.
2 They claim that
MGRM followed a textbook hedging strategy which was not properly understood by MG´s
supervisory board and house banks.
3 On the other hand, Edwards and Canter, Mello and Parsons,
and Ross argue that a 1:1 hedge strategy was significantly oversized given MGRM´s underlying oil
business.
4 These authors claim that the variance minimizing hedge ratio for MGRM´s business was
actually below 0.5:1. In this case, the 1:1 hedge strategy would increase MGRM´s oil price risk
instead of reducing it.
The dispute is not only of academic interest but also constitutes a crucial point in the legal
procedure of MGRM´s former chief trader W. Arthur Benson against Metallgesellschaft
Corporation in which he demands compensatory as well as punitive damages. According to Benson,
the new MG management team had untruthfully announced that speculative oil deals had led to the
massive losses of MGRM.
  5 In an interview, MG´s president of the supervisory board, Ronaldo
Schmitz, had compared the situation of MGRM with that of someone who lost all his money in a
casino and now demands new money in order to continue the game.
6 Among other things, the court
thus has to decide whether MGRM´s trading strategy was indeed a speculation or was instead
capable to effectively reduce MGRM´s oil price risk.
This paper explores the rationales for both views and argues that a different time horizon implicitly
underlying both arguments may at least partly explain the different  results. We run several tests
which indicate that an investor who wants to hedge oil price risk over a long time horizon will use a
considerably higher hedge ratio as a short term oriented investor. We then analyse the effect of
allowing cross hedges as were used by MGRM on its short term risk. Surprisingly, the analysis
shows that even when risk is measured over a short time horizon, a 1:1 hedge strategy had the
potential to effectively reduce MGRM’ oil price risk. Finally, we investigate whether MG’s equity
base was adequate to cover the short term risk of its oil operations.
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2  The Oil Business of MGRM
In 1991, MGRM started to market long term OTC oil contracts to its customers. These contracts
obligated MGRM to sell a variety of refined oil products at a predetermined price every month for
five or ten years.
7 The contract price was determined by the current future prices of the following 12
month plus a margin between 5 and 10 cent per gallon (equivalent to 2.1 - 4.2 $ per barrel). There
were two programs that differed in their attached cancellation rights („blow out option“) as well as
delivery timing options.
8 Under the so called firm fixed program that accounted for 2/3 of the
business, the customer had the right to cancel the contract when the front month future price
exceeded the contract price. In that case he was entitled to a payment of 50% of the price difference
times the amount of outstanding deliveries. During autumn 1993, 50% of the contracts were
renegotiated such that exercise would be triggered automatically when the front month future price
reached a certain level. The other program was the firm flexible contracts that allowed the
customers to choose the time of delivery of the underlying product as long as deliveries did not
exceed 20% of its yearly oil purchases. The firm flexible contracts also allowed early termination
when the second month futures price exceeded the contract price. In this case the customer was
entitled to a payment of the price difference times the outstanding amount. In order to compensate
MGRM for the larger flexibility of the customer the contract price was determined by the maximum
futures price of the following 12 month plus a higher margin.
The risk management strategy of  MGRM specified that „the firm may not engage in speculative
trading and therefore may not hold any outright long or short position“.
9 Since long term hedge
contracts were not available in the market to a sufficient extent, MGRM decided to use short term
futures and OTC swaps to hedge its exposure. By rolling these transactions forward at maturity
MGRM created a so called stacked hedge. The amount of  outstanding futures in barrels was at any
time equivalent to the amount of outstanding deliveries. A peculiarity of MGRM´s hedging program
was that oil traders were free to choose either gasoline, heating oil or crude oil futures as the
appropriate hedge contract.
10 According to the special auditors report, the actual hedge ratio even
exceeded 1:1 during autumn 1993 because MGRM initiated its hedging program at the time the
contract offer was made. However, contracts with a volume of 7.8 Million $ were not confirmed by
the customers and therefore created an temporary hedge ratio exceeding 1:1.
11
The volume of MGRM´s oil business increased tremendously in 1993. The long term delivery
programs started from a volume of 43 Million at the beginning of the year, more than tripled until
September 1993 and remained at that level until the end of the year when the liquidation of the
portfolio started.
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In December 1993, MGRM was forced to decrease its derivatives positions after counterparties of
OTC transactions refused to prolong swap transactions. Additionally, NYMEX had decreased
MGRM´s positions limit by suspending its hedge exemption status. Still open is the question how
the following liquidation was performed: According to MG, the delivery contracts with customers
and the hedge deals were reduced simultaneously to a volume of 109 Million barrel until February
1994.
12 In contrast, Culp and Miller claim that MG liquidated the whole hedging program before it
reduced its long term contract volume and thereby created an open position.
13 In the aftermath of the
liquidation, MG also decided to change its hedge strategy and abandoned the 1:1 hedge.
14 In the
following section, we want to investigate whether the 1:1 hedge had a sound economic foundation.
In order to keep the analysis simple and comparable with the existing papers, we ignore the option
components of MGRM´s delivery contracts.
3  Hedging Long Term Commitments with Short Term Futures: the
Time Horizon Problem
The diverging views that emerged concerning the effectiveness of MGRM´s hedging program are
based on very different analytics. Culp and Miller (1994) base their argument in favour of a 1:1
hedge ratio on a 3 period example with a numerical example in which a firms market value is fully
protected against spot price risk by using a 1:1 hedge strategy. In order to make their argument
somewhat more transparent, we develop the argument for arbitrary numbers. Consider a firm that
commits to deliver 1 barrel of oil in three periods at a price of C. Since the firm has no oil in its
storage, it buys it at the time of delivery at then prevailing spot prices. Let the spot price of oil at
time t be St, the future price of oil in t for delivery in t+i be Ft,i and let dSt and dFt,i denote the
change of these values over one period. Note that due to the decreasing maturity of the future Ft,i +
dFt,i = Ft+1,i-1 and Ft,1 + dFt,1 = St+1. Culp and Miller make the crucial assumption that the 1 period
future price has a constant basis of B, i.e. Ft,i=St+B.
15 In every period, it can buy xt short term
futures in order to hedge its oil price exposure which will result in a cash flow of  ( ) x S F t t t + - 1 1 , one
period later. Culp and Miller assume an interest rate of zero which makes the present value of the
program identical to the sum of its cash flows:
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Volume of Firm Fixed and Firm Flexible
Contracts
in Million barrels
December 1992 43
July 1993 84
September 1993 154
December 1993 150
Source: Special Auditors Report5
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When a 1:1 hedge is chosen such that xt equals the remaining total delivery commitment (x0=3,
x1=2,  x2=1), this formula reduces to
( ) V C S B = - - 3 2
0 (2)
As can be seen, the sum of cash flows is independent of future oil prices. Under the assumption of a
constant basis, the 1:1 hedge strategy is thus able to completely eliminate the risk from changing oil
prices. The assumption of a constant basis is clearly unrealistic. However, note that the argument
continues to hold if the basis is randomly fluctuating in the short run but at the same time its
average value over long horizons is not random.
On the other hand, Edwards and Canter derive their risk minimizing hedge ratio by regressing price
changes of long term futures on price changes of short term futures. This gives the variance
minimizing hedge ratio, if the volatility of wealth is minimized over the next period of time. To see
this, suppose that a firm commits to deliver 1 barrel of oil at t3. The initial market value of this
liability is -F0,3 . Given a position in one period futures of x0 the market value of both positions one
period later is -F1,2 + x0(S1-F0,1). and has a variance of
( ) ( ) Var V Var dF x Var dF x Cov dF dF 1 0 3 0
2
0 1 0 0 3 0 1 2 = + - ( ) ( ) , , , , , (3)
If the firm minimizes the variance of V1 , the resulting variance minimizing hedge position is
( )
x
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0
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0 1
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,
,
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x0  is of course identical to the regression as advocated by Edwards and Canter.
When comparing the two approaches, two main differences can be observed: first Culp and Miller
make an explicit assumption about the futures price formation while Edwards and Canter do not.
Secondly, Culp and Miller investigate the risk over the complete remaining life of the contract while
the Edwards/Canter analysis is based on a short term analysis of risk over the next period of time
only. In the following, we argue that the differing time horizons are an important reason for the
diverging results. The fact that there may be a difference between a short term and a long term view
on hedging is explicitly expressed in Benson (1994a, p.4f.) who reports that „it was understood by
all involved that the profitability of the program to be embarked upon was never to be looked at as a
snap-shot in time, but only on a long-term basis as the long-term commitments fully played out.“ To
investigate the importance of the time horizon, we first develop an analytical framework that is able
to encompass both approaches and to show the reasons for their different results.
Suppose as in Edwards and Canter that a firm enters into a delivery contract that specifies the
delivery of one barrel of oil in t3 at a price of C. Let the continuos interest rate used for discounting
be r. The present value of the combined delivery and hedge program at different points of time is6
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Note that cash flows must be discounted according to the period in which they fall. When choosing
its hedge policy in to the firm must choose a time horizon over which is wishes to minimize the risk.
Suppose for the moment that the firm takes a long term view and wishes the minimize the variance
of its value in t3, i.e. it wishes to minimize the risk of the overall outcome of the delivery contract.
When the firm chooses its initial hedge position x0 it must anticipate its later choices of x1 and x2
because the variance of V3 depends on x1 and x2 .The optimal hedge strategy at later points of time
can be found by backward induction. Using the fact that  S F dF dF dF
3 0 3 0 3 1 2 2 1 = + + + , , , , and that
S F dF
i i i - =
- - 1 1 1 1 , ,  the only remaining source of uncertainty in t2 is dF2,1 and irrespective of earlier
spot and futures price changes the variance of V3 as seen in period 2 is
  ( ) ( ) Var V t x Var dF ( ) , 3 2 2
2
2 1 1 = - (6)
Clearly the risk minimizing hedge is to set x2=1 which completely eliminates all remaining oil price
risk. Given this optimal choice in t2 we can now solve for the risk minimizing hedge in t1. Since the
time horizon is t3, the firm now has to choose its hedge ratio such that the variance of  V3  as
evaluated in period 1  is minimized under the assumption that x2=1. The resulting variance is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Var V t x e Var dF Var dF xe Cov dF dF
r r
3 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 = + - , , , , , (7)
The variance minimizing x1 turns out to be
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Now we are in a position to determine the optimal hedge ration in t0. At that point of time, the firm
anticipates that it will choose the optimal values of x1 and x2 in the future and will again choose x0
such that the risk of firm value changes over the remaining time periods is minimized. The risk
minimizing value for x0 turns out to be the following expression:
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The first term is similar to the expression forx1
* and is identical to the minimum hedge ratio
proposed by Edwards and Canter.
16 It is the usual hedge coefficient gained from a regression of the
short term futures price change on the long term future price changes. However, the minimum
variance hedge ratio formula consists of additional terms when risk is measured over a long time
horizon. The additional terms arise from the fact that the current change of the short term future
dF0,1  may be stochastically linked with the expected hedge returns in periods 2 and 3. Consider for
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example the second term: When there is a positive correlation between dF0,1  and dF1,2, a gain on the
short term future ceteris paribus tends to increase the value of the delivery commitment which
depends on dF1,2. Thus the firm would have to buy more protection against rising spot rates and
increase its hedge ratio. Equivalently, if the short term future is negatively autocorrelated
( ) ( ) Cov dF dF 0 1 1 1 0 , , , <  a profit on the period 1 hedge will ceteris paribus decrease the expected
period 2 hedge pay off. Again the firm needs more protection against rising spot rates and will
choose a higher hedge ratio.
The results of Edwards/Canter and Culp/Miller can now be shown to be special cases in the above
general framework. The hedge ratio of Edwards and Canter turns out to be the risk minimizing
hedge ratio when risk is minimized over a short (one period) time horizon. Under this assumption,
the firm chooses x0 as to minimize the variance of its value in t1. The value of the program in t1 and
its variance can be expressed as
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Although derived in a different context, the resulting variance minimizing hedge ratio turns out to be
the one advocated by Edwards and Canter:
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The hedge strategy advanced by Edwards and Canter is therefore the strategy that minimizes the
risk of short term wealth changes in the above framework. Alternatively, the Edwards and Canter
strategy is optimal for the long time horizon investor, when future price changes fulfil the OLS
conditions  ( ) ( ) ( ) Cov dF dF Cov dF dF
0 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0
, , , , , = = . When these conditions are met, equations (11)
and (9) collapse and the time horizon has no effect on the minimum variance hedge strategy.
17
Also the 1:1 hedge strategy of Culp and Miller can also be derived as a special case of the general
framework if we assume that future price changes satisfy the OLS conditions, that all futures have
the same volatility, that future prices are perfectly correlated and finally that the interest rate is zero.
In that case it is easy to verify that x0  in equation (9) turns out to be 1. However, this is of course
only one among many combinations of variances and covariances that result in a 1:1 hedge strategy.
Thus while the specific assumptions made by Culp and Miller are clearly unrealistic, their resulting
hedge strategy may not necessarily be wrong for hedges over a long time horizon.
The difference between of the optimal hedge ratio implied by equation (9) and hedge ratios gained
through regressions of high frequency data will to a large extent depend on the autocorrelation
structure of future price changes. When prices follow random walks and thus satisfy the OLS
conditions, it is well known that the minimum variance hedge ratio gained through a regression of
the Edward  and Canter type does not depend on the considered sampling interval.
18 However, it is
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well known that many commodity futures show long term seasonalities.
19 Moreover, it is a well
established empirical fact that it is often difficult to reject the random walk hypothesis using high
frequency data although long term changes show a high degree of predictability.
20 In order to assess
whether oil price changes fulfil the OLS conditions, first order autocorrelations of future price
changes over different time intervals were calculated. An approximate test of significance was
carried out using large sample confidence intervals.
21 The results indicate that first order
autocorrelation of daily changes is small and mostly insignificant. In contrast, first order
autocorrelations of price changes over longer time periods such as several month are large and
generally highly significant. As an example, first order autocorrelations of spot and future price
changes over 125 days are given in the table:
Given this high degree of autocorrelation, it is obvious that the time horizon of a hedger will be
affected by the chosen hedge ratio. The next section empirically investigates the risk minimizing
hedge ratio when a long time horizon is assumed.
4  Estimation of Hedge Ratios for Long Time Horizons
The question whether the 1:1 hedge strategy proposed by Culp and Miller is valid for long horizon
investors, can be answered only empirically. The fact that minimum variance hedge ratios may
dependent on the considered time horizon is a well documented fact in the hedging literature.
22 Chen,
Sears and Tzang provide evidence that minimum hedge ratios based on a one and two week time
horizon differ, with hedge ratios being larger in the two week case.
  23 Froot
24 considers a much
larger range of time horizons for the problem of hedging foreign exchange rate risk from foreign
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1 2 for q = t  -1, where n is the number of observations. See Granger and
Newbold (1977), p. 76.
22 See for example Stoll and Whaley (1993), p. 58.
23 Chen, Sears and Tzang (1987). See also their references for similar results in other markets.
24 Froot (1993).
First order autocorrelation  
of price changes over 125 days
Maturity  Autocorrelation 
Heating Oil 0 -0.250 ***
1 -0.262 ***
6 -0.222 **
Gasoline 12 -0.286
0 -0.278
1 -0.291
6 -0.281 **
Crude Oil 12 -0.268
0 -0.326 **
1 -0.325 **
6 -0.244
18 -0.210
*** (**)  indicates significance at the 99% (95%) level9
investments. He shows that the minimum variance hedge ratio of foreign stock holdings change
dramatically when the time horizon is changed: Over short time horizons, the risk minimizing hedge
strategy is close to 1:1 hedge while over time horizons of many years, the optimal hedge ratio is
close to zero. Given his results, a hedge strategy that is effective in the short run not only fails to
reduce risk over long time horizons but actually significantly increases long term risk. Similar
evidence is provided by Siegel
25 who calculates minimum variance portfolios of stocks and bonds
over different time horizons. While the risk minimizing portfolio over 1 year has only 6.2% stocks,
this amount increases to 72.1% when a 30 year time horizon is chosen.
The studies of Froot and Siegel are both based on extremely long time series reaching back to the
last century. For the case of oil price hedging, a severe limitation in estimating long time horizon
hedge ratios lies is the nonavailability of sufficient long term data series. Unfortunately oil futures
were not traded until the early 80th and the empirical data of the early years of trading is
notoriously incomplete due to market illiquidity. The existing data series therefore provide only
limited evidence on oil market dynamics over long holding periods. Another problem with estimating
hedge ratios over long time horizons is the fact that exchange traded futures cover only future
contract maturities up to 12 (for heating oil and gasoline) and 18 month (for crude oil). However,
MGRM traded delivery contracts with maturities up to 10 years. The estimation of the variance
minimizing hedge ratio from equation (9) for the case of MGRM thus requires variance and
covariance estimators of future price maturities up to 10 years which cannot be estimated from
empirical data.
This paper applies several approaches in order to derive reasonable hedge ratios for long term hedge
strategy in the case of MGRM: First we show that OLS conditions are violated in the Edwards and
Canter regression and that the regression coefficients in the analysis of Edwards and Canter are
highly sensitive to the sampling interval over which price changes are measured. Second, we
perform a historical simulation where historical profits and losses of delivery contracts over the
complete contract length for different hedge strategies are simulated. Third we test the robustness of
our historical simulation results by performing similar simulations for contracts with shorter
maturities.
4.1  The Impact of the Sampling Interval on Estimated Hedge Ratios
In our first test, we investigate whether hedge ratios gained from a regression analysis as in
Edwards and Canter depend on the time lag between two observations. If the OLS conditions are
met, regression coefficients should be independent of the sampling interval, i.e. the time distance
between two observations should not affect the regression results. However, the long term
autocorrelations reported above indicate that OLS conditions may not be satisfied. Canter and
Edwards report that the Durbin Watson statistic of residuals did not show significant
autocorrelation. But the Durbin Watson test tests only for first order autocorrelation and fails to
identify autocorrelations of higher order. We used the Breusch-Godfrey test
26 in order to test for
higher order autocorrelation in the estimated residuals of the regression. When daily price changes
were used, there is indeed no first order autocorrelation as indicated by the Durbin Watson statistic.
We find significant residual autocorrelation for lags higher than the second (for heating oil and
crude oil) and the sixth order (for gasoline). To get a first impression of the importance of these
effects, we repeat the regression of Edwards and Canter for different sampling intervals and report
the resulting minimum variance hedge ratios:
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The table shows a considerable increase in the regression coefficient when the sampling interval is
increased, indicating that the sampling interval has a profound effect on hedge ratios. While the
analysis shows the hedge ratio is not invariant to the time horizon considered, it cannot be used to
directly derive hedge ratios for long term investors. The reason is that the short term future matures
within the sampling period. The change of short term futures prices over long time periods therefore
does not accurately specify the profit and loss of holding a short term future over long time
intervals. An estimation of hedge ratios over long time horizons must therefore account for the fact
that the final pay off is determined by the pay off of continuously rolling short term futures forward.
Additionally, regression analysis cannot be used to deliver hedge ratios for the case of MGRM
because no long term futures are traded.
4.2  Historical Simulation of Pay Offs from MGRM´s Oil Program
Fortunately, a historical simulation of contract pay offs prevents both problems of regression
analysis and is easily conducted. While we cannot determine the market value of a 5 year
commitment at any point of time, we can nonetheless simulate the exact pay offs from MGRM´s oil
program by calculating its cash flows over the complete contract duration for different historical
start dates. If a hedge strategy is effective in the long run, it should produce a low volatility of final
outcomes when applied to actual historical data. To evaluate this volatility, we simulate the final
outcome of a long term oil delivery program for different historical start dates and for different
hedge strategies. We simulate the outcome of a 5 year delivery programs which obligates MGRM to
deliver one barrel of oil every month for 5 years after the start date. One problem in the historical
simulation is the large variety of potential hedge strategies since we can choose different hedge
ratios for all 60 one month periods in the sample. In order to reduce the hedge strategy choice
problem to one single number, we restrict attention to exponential hedge strategies. According to
this strategy, one barrel of oil to be delivered in time T is hedged with an amount
x e t
T =
-d (12)
of short term futures. The exponential hedge strategy is a generalized form of the familiar „tailing
the hedge“ strategy
27 with a tailing factor of d. When the tailing factor is 0, the strategy implies the
1:1 hedge proposed by Culp and Miller. It can be easily shown that the exponential hedge strategy
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Regression coefficient from  D(Lag x)F(t,T)=a+b D(Lag x)F(t,1)+e
for different time lags
Lag
in days
Heating Oil
12 month
Gasoline
12 month future
Crude Oil
18 month future
1 0.42 0.47 0.37
5 0.48 0.46 0.43
20 0.59 0.61 0.44
60 0.63 0.71 0.49
120 0.77 0.72 0.62
240 0.77 0.72 0.62
Regression estimates of Relationship between front month and long term futures prices.
Daily Futures price data rolled at expiration from Jan 1985- Feb. 1995 were used.11
encompasses the variance minimizing hedge strategy if all returns are i.i.d., interest rates are
constant and the correlation between futures and spot prices is one. In this case, the tailing factor d
of the minimum variance hedge turns out to be the interest rate. Additionally, Ross
28 has shown that
this strategy is risk minimizing when the spot price follows a mean reverting process and the market
price of basis risk is zero. He also shows that this strategy has desirable robustness properties when
the stochastic process is not known.
In the historical simulation, the present value of all cash flows over 5 years is calculated as a
function of the tailing factor d. Monthly crude oil futures prices that are rolled at expiration is used
to calculate the monthly pay offs. Oil price data from January 1984 until January 1995 is used.
From this data, 73 overlapping observations of 5 year contracts starting between January 1984 and
January 1990 are calculated. The one month federal funds rates were used to discount cash flows. In
line with the MGRM practice for the firm fixed program, the contract price is set to be the average
of the futures prices with maturities up to 9 month at the start date plus a margin of 2.1 $. Then we
calculate the volatility of the resulting present values and its mean for different values of d. These
results are summarized in the following chart which shows the risk return combinations for different
values of d:
The hedge ratio displayed in the chart is the hedge ratio at the contract start date implied by the
specific exponential strategy under consideration. As can be seen, the 1:1 hedge performs
surprisingly well over long time horizons. Contrary to the conclusion of Edwards and Canter, it is
far less risky than not hedging at all. It is also considerably less risky than the 1: 0.5 hedge strategy
proposed by Edwards and Canter. The risk minimizing hedge strategy turns out to start with an
initial hedge ratio of 1: 0.92. The diagram also shows that large hedge ratios are considerably more
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profitable that small ones. This effect is due to the well known fact that oil future markets have been
in backwardation much more often than in contango. The strategy of simply rolling forward one
month oil futures therefore was on average profitable in the past. An investor who aims to optimize
his risk reward trade off instead of simply minimizing his risk would therefore choose a hedge ratio
which is higher than the variance minimizing hedge ratio.
It is interesting to compare our results with the simulation results of Ross (1995) which qualitatively
confirm the Edwards and Canter result. Ross does not perform a historical simulation but generates
random samples of possible oil price path over nine years using a bootstrap algorithm on daily price
changes. In one simulation he generates random future and spot price paths by resampling
independently historical returns of holding the front month future and the spot price return. By
assuming independence between daily returns, his analysis clearly fails to account for possible long
term seasonalities in oil price data.
4.3  The Issue of Precontractual Risk
One interesting difference between the hedge ratio estimation from a historical simulation and a
traditional analysis should be noted: the issue of pre contractual risk. The usual regression analysis
covers only postcontractual risk that arises after the delivery contract has been signed because it is
only concerned with wealth changes after the contract is signed. In the historical simulation, the
present value of all cash flows depends both on postcontractual price changes and the contract price
fixed at the start date. If the contract price equals the market price of a forward with appropriate
maturity, then the very act of signing a delivery contract does not create or destroy wealth on its
own. However, the contract price in the case of MGRM was the average of short term futures
prices, which will only by chance equal the (unknown) price of long term futures. The empirical
evidence indicates that high spot prices tend to be associated with a decreasing future price curve (a
backwardation situation) and vice versa.
29 If futures prices have predictive power for future spot
prices and MGRM sells in a time of low spot prices, its contracts tend to have negative present
value at the contract start day and vice versa. MGRM could offset this risk by buying more short
term futures because these compensate the precontractual loss from increasing spot prices.
Due to the limited amount of historical data, the results of the historical simulation must be
interpreted with caution. Nonetheless it provides clear evidence that hedge estimates based on the
same empirical data may be very different when one changes the time horizon. In order to check
both the importance of precontractual risk and the robustness of our simulation results, we repeat
the simulation for a one year delivery contract of crude oil. Neglecting interest rate effects, the
present value of cash flows is:
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The variance of present values derived from all cash flows during the contract period was calculated
for all monthly start dates between November 1983 and February 1994. Since 12 month futures
prices are available for the considered time period, we can separately calculate present values with
and without precontractual risk. 3 different hedge ratios are reported in the table below: First the
slope from regressing monthly changes of 12 month futures on 1 month futures as calculated as in
Edwards and Canter. Second the initial hedge position from an exponential hedge strategy that
minimizes the variance of the outcome after one year is calculated when the contract delivery price
Ct is the 12 month forward price at the contract start date, i.e. there is no precontractual risk. Third,
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we introduce the maximum possible amount of precontractual risk into the contract by replacing the
delivery price Ct  by the current spot price St and again report the resulting initial risk minimizing
hedge position.
The table shows that lengthening the time horizon increases the risk minimizing hedge ratio.
However, the consideration precontractual risk leads to a further significant increase of the
minimum variance hedge ratio. In the example, the effect introduced by precontractual risk is even
larger than the time horizon effect. Whether this was also the case in the MGRM simulation cannot
be determined definitely since the decomposition in pre- and postcontractual risk requires a
valuation of the delivery commitment at any point of time. If precontractual risk is important, one
may wonder whether the assumption in the historical simulation that MGRM sells one barrel of oil
every month is indeed realistic. Since futures prices have predictive power in respect to future spot
prices,
30 customers may realize that their expected pay off from the delivery program is higher when
the futures market is in contango, i.e. long term futures prices exceed short term prices. In times of
backwardation, the contract price exceeds the expected future oil price and customers may be
reluctant to enter into the contract. This view is consistent with the observation that MGRM
experienced a large expansion of its contract volume during summer 1993 when the market was in
contango.
5  Cross Hedges and the Amount of Risk Assumed by MGRM
The preceding evidence shows that the 1:1 hedge strategy MGRM had taken made good sense when
MG took a long term perspective on risk: Contrary to the short horizon analysis, the strategy was
effectively reducing oil price risk and it produced positive expected hedging profits. In this section,
we want to extend the analysis in two directions: First, we want to investigate the impact on hedge
ratios of the fact that MGRM did also use cross hedges. Since MGRM´s oil traders had the freedom
to choose between gasoline, heating oil and crude oil futures, the minimum variance hedge ratio may
be different from the single product case considered so far. Second we want to examine whether MG
had enough equity capital to bear the short term price risks of its oil program. Even when the 1:1
hedge strategy made sense in the long run, its success depended on the ability of MG to absorb
temporary losses. The preceding analysis implies that a 1:1 hedge strategy comes at the cost of
substantial short term risk. We want to investigate, whether the equity capitalization of MG was
sufficient to cover this risk.
31
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31 Mello and Parsons
31 argue that the real risk of MG was not oil price risk bur liquidity risk. Since the
cash losses from its hedge program were only compensated by unrealized gains from their delivery
contracts, the program could be carried out only when enough liquidity was available. The argument of
Mello and Parsons is certainly valid in a world of highly imperfect capital markets. However, MG had
strong ties to its house banks and there is little reason to believe that these banks would not be willing to
lend to MG as long as enough collateral in the form of unrealized gains from their delivery contracts was
available. The much larger danger for MGRM was probably the fact that the 1:1 hedge strategy created a
very high probability that temporary short term losses would wipe out the firms equity capital.
Minimum Variance Hedge ratios from hedging 1
year delivery contracts with 1 month futures
1 month time horizon 0.51
1 year time horizon without precontractual risk 0.64
1 year time horizon with precontractual risk 0.87
based on monthly crude oil futures prices 1983 - 199514
As a measure to quantify MG´s ability to absorb short term losses, we use the value at risk
approach as defined by the BIS proposals
32 which will define the future minimum equity
capitalization for banks engaging in securities and derivatives trading. Since the main competitors of
MGRM were banks, it is interesting to know whether MGRM would have been able to carry out its
program if it were a bank under future capital standards. The BIS defines value at risk as the
maximum loss within a 99% confidence interval measured over a ten day holding period. The
required bank equity base must exceed 3 times its value at risk of its trading book (plus the equity
cushion needed to cover credit risk). Three methods are allowed to calculate value at risk: the
variance covariance approach, historical simulation, and Monte Carlo simulation. Since MGRM
traded only forward delivery contracts and futures which do not carry convexity risk, a Monte Carlo
simulation in this case will coincide with the variance covariance approach.
33 Thus, we calculate
value at risk for both the variance covariance approach and the historical simulation.
The variance covariance approach is an application of Markowitz portfolio theory to the risk of
arbitrary trading positions. Two basic assumptions are needed to derive the maximum loss within a
99% confidence interval of a portfolio of positions: returns are assumed to follow a multivariate
normal distribution and portfolio profit is approximated with a local first order Taylor series
expansion of the pricing functions of every portfolio position. Under these assumptions, the
portfolio profit is also normally distributed and the worst loss is the appropriate percentile of the
resulting density function. The profit over the next 10 days is thus calculated as
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where Si are the stochastic risk factors that affect the present value of positions and rSi is the risk
factor return measured over 10 trading days. If returns of the underlying risk factors are
multivariate normally distributed, it can be shown that the profit is normally distributed with a
standard deviation of
s
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where r is the vector of current risk factor values and ￿ is the variance covariance matrix of risk
factor returns measured over 10 days.  If expected risk factor returns are set to zero, the worst loss
within a one sided 99% confidence interval can be determined as the appropriate percentile of the
normal distribution function:
VaR = 233 . s p . (16)
In the case of MGRM, the underlying risk factors were the price of the physical delivery contracts
with customers and the one month futures price of the hedge contracts used. For the value at risk
calculation, we neglect the option component of the delivery contracts. The resulting present value
functions are thus simply the product of positions size and the appropriate future prices. One
problem in estimating MGRM´s value at risk is the fact that MGRM made physical delivery
contracts of a large variety of refined oil products, some of which are not traded on any futures
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33 The analysis neglects the option components of the delivery contracts which would introduce some
convexity risk.15
exchange (for example aviation gasoline).
34 For our risk estimation we assume that MGRM had
only physical delivery positions in gasoline and heating oil for which futures prices exist. Of course,
this assumption neglects some spread risks and is therefore likely to underestimate true risk.
Another problem lies in the unavailability of long term futures prices necessary to value MGRM´s
delivery contracts. We therefore assume that the futures price with the longest available maturity
(i.e. 12 month futures for gasoline and heating oil) is a reasonable proxy for the long term forward
prices. Since two thirds of MGRM´s positions were established in 1993 and had mostly original
maturities of 5 and ten years, this assumption clearly underestimates the risk of MGRM. One
peculiarity of MGRM´s hedge strategy was the fact that hedge positions were established in either
the gasoline, heating oil or crude oil market. By shifting the hedge positions from market to market,
MGRM intended to profit from short term price imbalances.
35 We account for this fact by
calculating value at risk for alternative choices of the hedge markets. Finally, the exact distribution
of physical delivery contract over the various oil products is not publicly available. We thus assume
different combinations of gas and heating oil commitments that sum up to the total commitment as
reported in the special auditors report.
Finally an evaluation date for which value at risk shall be determined must be chosen. We take the
30th September 1993 as the evaluation day, because the annual balance sheet was derived for this
day so that we can compare MGRM´s value at risk with MG´s equity at that day. Furthermore the
total amount of delivery contracts apparently reached its peak during autumn 1993. We use the
volume of delivery contracts reported in the Special Auditors Report for September 1993 which is
154 Million barrels.
For the historical simulation, the profit and loss from risk factor changes over historical 10 day
periods is calculated with the same approach as for the variance covariance approach. After
ordering the resulting profits and losses, value at risk is determined as the 99% percentile of the
resulting empirical frequency distribution. Both the historical simulation and the variance
covariance method use 400 (overlapping) 10 day return observations covering a time interval
between February 1992 and September 30th 1993.
For different alternative hedge strategies, the resulting value at risk figures are shown in the
following table:
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The first three positions derive value at risk for different physical delivery contract scenarios under
the assumption that no hedge position had been entered into. The following 4 positions assume some
possible 1:1 hedge alternatives that may have been chosen by MGRM. Positions 8 through 12 show
the minimum value at risk that could have been reached by hedging in the three available hedge
markets without the 1:1 hedge restriction. Finally, position 13 and 14 shows the minimum and
maximum value at risk that might have been obtained by using a 1:1 hedge strategy.
The table reveals that MGRM’s value at risk of MGRM was huge in comparison to its equity base
for most cases considered. MG´s equity capital was 1,118 Million DM, which in September 1993
was equivalent to less than 700 Million $. Under BIS guidelines, the equity base must exceed tree
times its value at risk such that MG’s equity was able to cover at most a value at risk of 233 million
$. In many cases, the value at risk exceeded this limit. This is especially true if risk were measured
by the historical simulation method. The generally higher figures for the historical simulation
method reflect strong deviations of some oil future returns from the normal distribution. Even if the
oil program of MGRM was the only risky activity of the whole MG group, MG´s equity under some
scenarios did not fulfil the future BIS regulation. In light of the fact that our analysis is likely to
underestimate the true risk and given the fact that MGRM was by far not the only risk taking unit of
MG, it appears that MG was grossly undercapitalized as compared to the BIS regulative guidelines.
Given the large value at risk figures, it is interesting to investigate whether the simpler „standard
method“ proposed by the Bank for International Settlements
36 may result in lower equity
requirements. The standard approach derives the required equity cushion as a simple linear function
of the nominal positions. Risk reducing effects from hedge transactions with the same product are
acknowledged with a simple reduction formula that depends on the maturity difference between the
offsetting transactions. (Forward Gap Formula). The Bank for International Settlements proposes to
considers two products to be the same if their correlation coefficient exceeds 0.9. Since the return
correlations between crude oil , heating oil and gasoline are all below 0.9, MGRM´s required equity
depends on whether the hedges were executed in the same product or a cross market. Under the most
favourable assumptions, the resulting equity capital turns out to be 566 Million $. If all hedge deals
were placed in cross hedges, both hedge deals and physical commitments would be treated as simple
open positions producing equity requirements of as much as 2,533 Million $!
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No. Description Comment Delivery contract Position* Hedge Position* Value at Risk**
 Heating Gas Heating Gas Crude Var/Cov Hist. Sim.
1 no hedge -154 0 0 0 0 169 161
2 " 0 -154 0 0 0 291 464
3 " -77 -77 0 0 0 200 258
4 1:1 hedge -154 0 154 0 0 230 278
5 " 0 -154 0 154 0 284 301
6 " -77 -77 77 77 0 188 193
7 " -77 -77 0 0 154 137 140
8 Min. Variance no crude futures -77 -77 65 19 0 114 125
9 " only crude futures -77 -77 0 0 101 103 125
10 " only heating futures -154 0 59 0 0 117 102
11 "  only gasoline futures 0 -154 0 80 0 226 373
12 " all futures -77 -77 23 4 73 100 124
13 " 1:1 hedge,all futures -77 -77 15 7 132 136 121
14 Max. Variance 1:1 hedge,all futures -77 -77 0 154 0 283 240
* in Mio barrel                        ** in Mio. $17
The table also shows that a 1:1 hedge strategy was able to significantly reduce value at risk as
compared with the no hedge alternative if the hedge was placed in the right hedge products. When
delivery contracts were evenly divided between gasoline and heating oil contracts, the 1:1 hedge
could have reduced value at risk from 200 to 136 million $ according to the variance covariance
method. When risk is measured with the historical simulation method, risk could have been reduced
even more (by 53% from 258 to 121 million $). By giving up the 1:1 hedge restriction, it is possible
to further decrease value at risk, albeit only by a smaller extent (a further 26% from 136 to 100
according to the variance covariance method). We can thus conclude that the 1:1 hedge strategy had
the potential to effectively reduce risk even when risk is measured over a short time horizon. The
inclusion of cross hedges thus reverses the Edwards/Canter result according to which a 1:1 hedge
strategy tends to increase risk. The main reason for this result is the fact that the risk minimizing
hedge strategy makes heavy use of cross hedges in crude oil contracts which were not considered by
Edwards and Canter. Cross hedges are attractive because 12 month gasoline future returns have a
much stronger correlation with front month crude oil prices than with front month gasoline prices.
37
As a consequence, a risk minimizing hedge of gasoline delivery contracts will obviously include
crude oil futures.
Although a 1:1 hedge strategy had the potential to effectively reduce risk, this effect is by no means
guaranteed. By placing the hedge in „wrong“ hedge products, it is even possible to substantially
increase value at risk as compared to the no hedge alternative.  (Value at risk under the variance
covariance method increases by 36% for the case of heating oil contracts.) This demonstrates that
MGRM’s risk management guidelines were not an effective tool to control its oil price risk. By only
prescribing a 1:1 hedge restriction without further restricting the hedge products, the guidelines left
so much freedom to MGRM’s traders that these could either increase or decrease value at risk as
compared to the no hedge alternative.
6  Conclusion
The diverging views on the appropriateness of MGRM´s 1:1 hedging strategy that have appeared in
the literature can be traced back to different underlying time horizons that are implicitly assumed.
This paper shows that investors with long time horizons will consider a much higher hedge ratio as
risk minimizing as compared to short horizon investors. Using a historical simulation which
simulates final contract pay offs at maturity we find that a 1:1 hedge ratio was capable to
substantially reduce MGRM´s oil price risk over the long run.
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correlation patterns used by MGRM for the period 1985 - 1994 which are reproduced in Ma (1995).18
Furthermore, the existing literature neglects the effects of cross hedges as employed by MGRM.
When cross hedges are included in the analysis, it is shown that even over a short time horizon, a
1:1 hedge ratio had the potential of significantly reducing the risk assumed by MGRM. However,
the 1:1 hedge strategy was not able to guarantee an effective hedge because it did not specify the
hedge products to be used. There exist 1:1 hedge strategies which even lead to a higher short term
risk as compared to the no hedge alternative. MGRM’s risk management guidelines thus were not
effective in forcing traders to use the futures markets in a way that reduced its overall oil price risk.
While the exact composition of MGRM’s portfolio is not known, it is safe to say that the short term
risk was very large in comparison to MG’s equity base. If MG would be subject to the future BIS
regulation of market risk for banks, MG had probably not been able to run such large positions.19
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